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TORTS-WRONGFUL BIRTH-PUBLIC POLICY FORBIDS AWARD OF
DAMAGES FOR EXPENSE OF RAISING A HEALTHY, BUT UNWANTED
CHILD. Wilbur v. Kerr, 276 Ark. 214, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982)
In December 1977, Virgil and Wilma Wilbur, plaintiffs, de-
cided to limit the size of their family for economic reasons. The
Wilburs consulted Dr. Robert Kerr and Dr. Paul Wilbur, defend-
ants, concerning a vasectomy for Mr. Wilbur, and the procedure
was performed in the defendants' office the same day.' Tests
showed that the vasectomy was unsuccessful, and the defendants
performed a second vasectomy. Subsequent tests showed that this
attempt was successful. The defendants informed the plaintiffs that
they could safely engage in intercourse without the further use of
contraceptives.2 Approximately one year later Mrs. Wilbur became
pregnant, resulting in the birth of a normal, healthy daughter. The
Wilburs filed a complaint alleging that the defendants' negligent
performance of the vasectomy was the proximate cause of the birth.
The complaint sought recovery for:
(1) Medical expenses incurred by Virgil Wilbur related to the
alleged failed vasectomy and its consequences; (2) pain and
mental anguish allegedly sustained by Virgil Wilbur; (3) medical
expenses incurred by Wilma Wilbur relating to the pregnancy
and delivery; and (4) the cost and expensive of raising the child,
including care, maintenance, support and education.3
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment stating
that no genuine issue of fact existed because Arkansas had not rec-
ognized "wrongful birth" as a cause of action. The trial court ruled
that the suit could continue upon proof of the defendants' negli-
gence for the damages sought for medical expenses, and pain and
mental anguish. The trial court sustained the motion on the issue
of damages for the expense of raising the child on the ground that
such an award was barred by public policy.- The plaintiffs then
amended their complaint and deleted all requests for recovery ex-
cept for the expense of raising the child. The trial court sustained
1. Brief for Appellant 4-5, Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982).
2. Id. at 5.
3. Id. at 10.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 11.
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the defendants' second motion for summary judgment and dis-
missed the complaint.6
On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court limited the issue to
whether damages should be allowed for the expense of raising a
normal, healthy child born as a result of a negligently performed
vasectomy. The court affirmed the holding of the trial court. Wilbur
v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982).
A cause of action based on the birth of an unwanted child is a
relatively new development in American law.7 The United States
Supreme Court's decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut" and Roe v.
Wade9 signaled a shift in overall public policy in a direction that
favors an individual's right to limit the size of his family. Both deci-
sions emphasized a constitutionally protected right of privacy which
is violated if couples are denied the right to take preventive meas-
ures to avoid the future birth of children. This shift in policy, cou-
pled with an increased use of various methods of birth control over
the past twenty years,' 0 has prompted the development of two new
causes of action in tort, those for wrongful life and wrongful birth.
A distinction must be made between "wrongful life" and
"wrongful birth." Both stem from the birth of an unwanted child
due to a defendant's negligence or misrepresentation, but they are
separate and distinct causes of action. Wrongful life is an action
brought on behalf of the child alleging that the child should not
have been born and was therefore injured by his own birth." With
one exception, 12 every state has refused to recognize this cause of
action on the grounds that it is impossible to measure the value of
6. Id. at 12.
7. Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934) (first case in which the
cause of action was asserted, although the court refused to recognize it as a valid cause of
action). J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 14.06 (Supp. 1981).
8. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (the Court held a Connecticut statute prohibiting the distribu-
tion of birth control information to married couples unconstitutional on the ground that it
violates a constitutionally protected right of privacy).
9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (the Court held unconstitutional a Texas statute prohibiting
abortion at any stage of pregnancy, except to save the life of the mother).
10. Westoff & Jones, Contraception and Sterilization in the United States, 1965-1975, 9
FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 153 (1977). The use of sterilization as a method of birth control
in the United States increased from 8.8% in 1965 to 31.3% in 1975 among those who used
some method of birth control. See Pilpel, Voluntary Sterilization: A Human Right, 7
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 105 (1975), and Dourlen-Rollier, Legal Problems Related to
Abortion and Menstrual Regulations, 7 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 120 (1975).
11. J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 14.06 (Supp. 1981).
12. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477
(1980) (defendant was grossly negligent in performing tests for fetal defects, plaintiffs par-
ents gave birth to a seriously defective child, and on these facts California became the first
[Vol. 5:593
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non-existence as compared to existence, and because one's life
should be considered sacred and not an injury.' 3 Wrongful life ac-
tions have been brought on behalf of healthy children, 14 children
born with a disease or deformity,' 5 and even by illegitimate children
alleging injury based on their bastardy. 6 Wrongful birth, on the
other hand, is an action usually brought by one or both of the child's
parents 7 seeking compensation for the various expenses attributable
to the unwanted birth caused by the defendant's negligence.' 8
While a few states still refuse to accept it,"' most jurisdictions
have now recognized wrongful birth as a cause of action. Among
those jurisdictions allowing a cause of action for wrongful birth, a
few have further distinguished actions involving deformed or defec-
tive children.2" For the most part, judicial recognition of the cause
state to award damages for wrongful life); see Note, Torts-Wrongful Lfe-Infant's Right to
Suefor Negligent Genetic Counseling, 48 TENN. L. REV. 493 (1981).
13. Elliot v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386
N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975);
Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
14. Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73
A.D. 724, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1979); Nelson v. Krusen, No. 82-106 slip op. (Tex. Ct. App.
May 3, 1982) (available Sept. 1, 1982, on Lexis, Omni states library, Texas file).
15. Gildiner v. Thoms Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Smith v.
United States, 392 F. Supp. 654 (E.D. Ohio 1975); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8
(1979); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57
A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977); Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 35 A.D.2d 531,
313 N.Y.S. 2d 502 (1970), aff-d, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972);
Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979), modoed 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1981).
16. Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976); Brown v. Bray, 300
So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1974); Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Zepeda
v. Zepeda, 41 111. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964);
Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966); Slawek v. Stroh,
62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974); see Note, Illegitimate Child Denied Recovery Against
Fatherfor "Wrongful Lfe", 49 IowA L. REV. 1005 (1964).
17. Wrongful birth actions have also been brought by the child's siblings alleging that
the child's birth has reduced their share of parental attention and financial support. No
court has recognized such an action. Aronoff v. Snider, 292 So. 2d 418 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1974); Cox. v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1974).
18. See Note, Wrongfiul Birth. A Child of Tort Comes afAge, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 65, 65
(1981).
19. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Johnson v. Yeshiva Univ.,
53 A.D.2d 523, 384 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1976), a~f'd 42 N.Y.2d 818, 364 N.E.2d 1340, 396
N.Y.S.2d 647 (1977); Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 35 A.D.2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d
502 (1970), afld 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1974); Terrell v. Garcia,
496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974); Rieck v. Medical
Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974). But see Annot., 83 A.L.3d 15, 29-35
(1978) (gives a detailed analysis of cases from those jurisdictions that recognize wrongful
birth).
20. See Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974); Berman v. Allan, 80
UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5:593
of action has been slower to emerge for healthy children.21
Wrongful birth actions arise from a number of fact situations in
which the defendant is alleged to have been negligent. The most
frequent actions involve conception and birth following a vasec-
tomy22 or a tubal litigation,23 birth following an unsuccessful abor-
tion,24 erroneous diagnosis in which the woman is told she is not
pregnant, 25 unsuccessful use of an oral contraceptive or contracep-
tive device,26 pharmacist's error in filling a prescription,27 or failure
to perform or properly perform postoperative tests following a ste-
rility procedure.28 In cases involving deformed or defective children
the action has also been based on negligence in performing, or fail-
ing to perform tests for fetal defects.2 9 Although no court has made
the distinction, it is interesting to note that the plaintiffs in wrongful
birth actions fall into two distinct categories. The first category in-
cludes plaintiffs in suits arising out of a failed sterilization opera-
N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Speck v.
Finegold, 408 A.2d 496 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979), modoied, 439 A.2d I10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
See also Morrison, Torts Involving the Unborn-A Limited Cosmology, 31 BAYLOR L. REV.
131, 153-60 (1979); Comment, Wronffiu Lfe: The Right Not to be Born, 54 TUL. L. REV. 480
(1980).
21. Unlike situations in which the injury is evidenced by an apparent defect, courts
have had difficulty in finding an injury associated with the birth of a normal child and have
denied the action based on the "blessed event" theory, see infra note 51, or have denied
recovery based on the "overriding benefits" rule, see infra note 58.
22. Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater
Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834
(1974); Shaheen v. Knight, I Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (Lycoming Cty. 1957); Ball v. Mudge, 64
Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
23. Sard v. Hardy, 34 Md. App. 217, 367 A.2d 525 (1976), rev'd, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d
1014 (1977); Clegg v. Chase, 89 Misc. 2d 510, 391 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1977); Vaughn v. Shelton,
514 S.W.2d 870 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974).
24. Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 2d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976); Wilczynski v.
Goodman, 73 111. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1979); Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1979), modrfed, 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
25. Debora S. v. Sapega, 56 A.D.2d 841, 392 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1977); Chapman v. Schultz,
89 Misc. 2d 543, 383 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1976); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514,
219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
26. J.P.M. v. Schmid Laboratories, Inc., 178 N.J. Super 122, 428 A.2d 515 (1981).
27. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
28. Sard v. Hardy, 34 Md. App. 217, 367 A.2d 525 (1976), rev'd 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d
1014 (1977); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977). See also Note,
supra note 18, at 66-67. Causation may be difficult to prove in an action arising from an
allegedly negligently performed vasectomy due to a slight risk of recanalization in which the
severed vas defrens reattach naturally after a properly performed vasectomy.
29. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846
(Tex. 1975) (in which the court held that public policy could not be used to bar recovery for
the expenses incurred in treating and caring for the defective child); Dumer v. St. Michael's
Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
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tion. They contend that they have taken steps to prevent pregnancy
and should be permitted to recover damages although they failed to
seek an abortion once conception was discovered." The second cat-
egory includes plaintiffs in actions involving an unsuccessful abor-
tion, failure to diagnose pregnancy, and failure to perform pre-natal
tests. They contend that they were denied information which would
have allowed them to make the informed decision to seek an abor-
tion, a right denied them by the defendant's negligence.3'
The most common and most successful theory of recovery in
wrongful birth actions has been negligence in tort.32 Actions based
on breach of contract, breach of warranty, and misrepresentation
have met with little success.33 Negligence actions involve a breach
of duty by the defendant,34 which includes a lack of informed con-
sent if the defendant failed to warn of the risk of failure associated
with certain birth control methods or failed to outline alternative
methods of birth control 5.3  Failure to properly test or diagnose has
30. See supra notes 22 and 23.
31. See supra notes 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28.
32. Robertson, Cipil Liability Arising from "Wrongful Birth" Following an Unsuccessful
Sterilization Operation, 4 AM. J. L. & MED. 131 (1978), sets out four stages in a sterilization
procedure at which negligence may occur. (1) preoperative stage (lack of informed consent);
(2) performance of the operation (unlikely to apply res ipsa loquitur in actions involving a
vasectomy due to risk of recanalization); (3) postoperative testing (failure to confirm re-
moval of actual fallopian tissue after a tubal ligation, or failure to test for live spermatozoa
in ejaculate following a vasectomy); and (4) post operative counseling (failure to disclose
adverse test results or assurances that the operation was 100% effective). Id. at 139-44.
33. Bishop v. Bynre, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967) (stating that a physician does
not guarantee results by providing services); Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1974) (separate consideration required to find a guarantee); Christensen v.
Thomby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934) (separate contract required for such a war-
ranty). But see Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) (judgment
for plaintiffs on the ground that defendant misrepresented the operation as 100% successful).
For a unique theory of recovery, see Roman v. City of New York, 110 Misc. 2d 799, 442
N.Y.S.2d 945 (1981), in which the plaintiff claimed misrepresentation because she relied on
a statement in the defendant's planned parenthood publication which said continued use of
contraceptives was not necessary following a sterilization operation. The plaintiff under-
went a tubal ligation, discontinued use of birth control pills and became pregnant. The
complaint was dismissed on the ground that causation was too remote.
34. Liability is based on the traditional elements of negligence: a duty of care owed by
the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and an injury to the plaintiff proxi-
mately caused by the breach. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 at 143
(4th ed. 1971). Arkansas uses the locality doctrine to determine whether a physician's ac-
tions were negligent. Under the locality doctrine negligence is found if the doctor failed to
use the same degree of skill, care, and knowledge used by physicians in the same or a similar
locality. Gambill v. Stroud, 258 Ark. 766, 531 S.W.2d 945 (1975).
35. Sard v. Hardy, 34 Md. App. 217, 367 A.2d 525 (1976), rey'd, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d
1014 (1977); Garwood v. Locke, 552 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
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also been the basis for negligence claims.36
Once negligence has been found, several arguments have been
asserted by defendants in an attempt to limit liability. In a case
involving the birth of a defective child, one defendant maintained
that his failure to perform fetal tests was not the proximate cause of
the defect." Several defendants have contended that the parents'
intercourse and the defendants' negligence was the proximate cause
of the pregnancy. 38 Another defendant argued that the parents were
contributorily negligent by failing to follow his advice to continue
the use of other methods of birth control after the sterilization pro-
cedure. 39 Finally, an argument often made in wrongful birth ac-
tions is that the plaintiffs failed to mitigate damages by not seeking
an abortion or putting the child up for adoption once it was born.4
Most courts have rejected this mitigation argument, saying that only
reasonable steps need be taken to reduce an injury, and to require
abortion or adoption is not reasonable.4
Even though most states now recognize wrongful birth actions,
there is still wide disagreement over the types of damages that are
compensable.42 The most common damages sought are those for the
36. See supra note 25, for cases involving failure to detect pregnancy. See Robertson,
supra note 32, at 142, on failure to conduct postoperative tests to determine success of the
sterility operation. See generally Halligan, Excusing by Statute the Missing Elements of Torts
ofEugenic Nondisclosure, 9 J. LEGIS. 52 (1982) (in cases involving a child born with a hered-
itary disease, the defendant may have been negligent in failing to perform or inform the
plaintiff of amniocentesis, a test which can reveal at the sixteenth week of pregnancy more
than 60 inherited diseases which might be present in the fetus).
37. Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654 (E.D. Ohio 1975) (argument rejected).
38. Bishop v. Bryne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967) (act was forseeable and was
not an intervening cause); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967)
(argument rejected).
39. Martineau v. Nelson, 311 Minn. 92, 247 N.W.2d 409 (1976); (issue remanded for
new trial).
40. Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974); Shaheen v. Knight,
11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (Lycoming Cty. 1957); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514,
219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
41. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511(1971) (mitigation requirement
is unreasonable); Martineau v. Nelson, 311 Minn. 92, 247 N.W.2d 409 (1976) (no duty to
seek abortion or adoption); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 234, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265, 270
(1974) (plaintiff had a right, but not an obligation to seek an abortion). Many cases cite C.
MCCORMICK HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 35 at 133 (1935), which reads:
If the effort, risk, sacrifice, or expense which the person wronged must incur in
order to avoid or minimize a loss or injury is such that under all the circumstances
a reasonable man might well decline to incur it, a failure to do so imposes no
disability against recovering full damages.
42. See Trotzig, The Defective Child and the Actionsfor Wronfful Life and Wrongful
Birth. 14 FAM. L. Q. 15 (1980).
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expense of the failed sterilization operation,43 mental anguish
caused by the unwanted conception and birth," the expense of the
pregnancy and delivery,45 the mother's lost wages,' loss of consor-
tium47 and the expense of raising the child.48 Courts generally have
awarded damages for the expense of the unsuccessful sterilization
operation and the expense of the delivery and birth, but have dis-
agreed on the other damages, 49 especially recovery for the expense
of raising the child. 0
The most common bar to recognition of either the cause of ac-
tion, or an award of damages, has been public policy considerations.
The earliest policy reason used by the courts to deny recognition of
the action was the "blessed event" theory.5I This theory states that
43. Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976) (damages awarded).
44. Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974) (damages awarded);
Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 42, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976) (damages awarded); Speck v.
Finegold, 408 A.2d 496 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) modeed, 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)
(damages for emotional distress awarded upon modification). Awards for mental anguish
are more commonly awarded in cases involving defective children. See e.g., Berman v.
Allan 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979) (damages for mental anguish awarded because child
was born with Down's Syndrome which doctor failed to discover).
45. Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967) (damages awarded); Stills v.
Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976) (damages awarded).
46. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 NW.2d 511 (1971) (damages awarded);
Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974) (damages awarded.
47. Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974) (damages awarded);
Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976) (damages awarded); Vaughn v.
Shelton, 514 S.W.2d 870 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974 (issue of damages remanded).
48. The courts have been nearly evenly split about whether damages for the expense of
raising the child are compensable. For cases in which recovery was allowed see Custodio v.
Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 445
A.2d 883 (1982); Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Sup. 126, 366 A.2d 204 (1976); Cockrum
v. Baumgartner, 99 II. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981); Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich.
App. 545, 265 N.W.2d 411 (1978); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511
(1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Bowman v. Davis, 48
Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 428 A.2d 1366 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1981).
For cases in which recovery was denied see Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1974); Public Health Trust v. Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980);
Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1979); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J.
421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Sorkin v. Lee, 78 A.D.2d 180, 434 N.Y.S.2d .300 (1980); Jacobs v.
Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219
N.W.2d 242 (1974).
49. Some plaintiffs have sought only damages for the expenses related to the actual
birth in order to avoid the controversy associated with other damages, such as the expense of
raising the child. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895
(1978); Garwood v. Locke, 552 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (healthy child born follow-
ing a tubal ligation).
50. See supra note 48.
51. Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934). The United States
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the birth of a child is not an injury because it is the natural by-
product and goal of a marriage and is, therefore, a blessed event.
Despite the shift in public policy in a direction favoring birth con-
trol, recent cases have used a similar "sanctity of life" argument to
dismiss the action.52 Proponents of that argument reason that life is
sacred and cannot be held an injury. Another policy reason used by
the courts has been the concern that recognition of such an action
would lead to an increase in frivolous and fraudulent claims.5 3
Other courts have held that recognition of a new cause of action is
within the purview of the legislatures and not the courts, but very
few legislatures have passed legislation on this issue.54
In many jurisdictions which recognize wrongful birth, public
policy has been used as a basis to deny recovery for various alleged
injuries, particularly the expense of raising the child. One argument
used is that an award of damages for the expense of raising the child
is out of proportion to the defendant's culpability and it would cre-
ate a new category of surrogate parent. 5 This reasoning is fre-
quently coupled with the argument that such expenses are too
speculative and are incapable of calculation. 6
Supreme Court decisions in Griswold and Wade, see supra notes 8 and 9, have made this
argument obsolete in theory because they hold that a couple has a constitutionally protected
right of privacy in choosing to limit the size of their family by the use of birth control
techniques. For a case rejecting the "blessed event" theory see Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal.
App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 475 (1967) (first court to recognize that the birth of a healthy
child is not always a blessed event); see also Morrison supra note 20, at 159.
52. Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974); Gleitman v. Cosgrove,
49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
53. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
945 (1964) (in which the Court held that if a cause of action for wrongful birth were recog-
nized there would be no limit to the extension of liability, including suits for being born a
certain color or race, or for being born into a destitute family); see also Howard v. Lecher, 53
A.D.2d 420, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1976); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219
N.W.2d 242 (1974). But see Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977).
See generally Note, "Wrongful Life'"-A New Tort? 17 HASTINGS L. J. 400 (1965) (discusses
the administrative burdens which would result from recognition of the cause of action);
recent cases, Freedom From Illegitimate Birth, 55 Ky. L. J. 719 (1966-67) (discusses the
"flood of litigation" that would result from such recognition).
54. See, e.g., Georgia Voluntary Sterilization Act of 1970, GA. CODE ANN. § 84-935.1
(1970) (physician's liability for wrongful birth extends to negligent acts only, and not to
breach of contract).
55. Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974). The court
reasoned that recovery for the expense of raising the child would create too great a burden
for the defendant. To give the parents the joy and satisfaction of raising the child and at the
same time require the defendant to pay all the expenses incurred would create a new cate-
gory of surrogate parent. See also Annot., 83 A.L.R.3d 15, at 48 (1978).
56. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 24, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (1967) in which the
court states, "[T]he parent's compensatory damages would entail balancing the intangible,
NOTES
Courts have also considered the adverse effect upon the child
which might result from such an award. The "emotional bastard"
theory suggests that if a child later learns of the suit he will be inca-
pable of dealing emotionally with the fact that his parents brought
suit because he was unwanted. 7
In considering damages for the expense of raising the child,
many courts have offset recovery with the value of the benefits of
parenthood. Those courts which have used the "overriding bene-
fits" rule usually denied recovery based on the reasoning that the
benefits of parenthood far outweigh the expense of raising the
child.5" Other courts have applied a benefits rule based on the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts section 9209 and have only reduced the
amount of the award.' Although both systems measured the same
benefit against the same injury, the outcome usually varied with the
theory applied.6'
Even though recognition of the cause of action was not the
stated issue in Wilbur v. Kerr,62 it was an issue that had never been
decided in Arkansas. Recognition was implied when Justice Hick-
man, writing for the majority, stated, "Most states recognize this as a
valid cause of action grounded in tort . ,,63 Since the court fo-
cused on the issue of damages for raising a normal, but unwanted
child, it cited several representative cases from other jurisdictions
unmeasureable, and complex human benefits of motherhood and fatherhood. . . against
the alleged emotional and money injuries. Such a proposed weighing is impossible to per-
form." Compare the similarity of this argument with the "blessed event" theory, supra note
51, which states that the value and benefits of parenthood cannot be considered an injury.
57. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) (theory rejected);
Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (theory rejected). See Note, The
Birth of a Child Following an Ineffective Sterilization Operation as Legal Damage, 9 UTAH L.
REv. 808 (1965) (origin of the "emotional bastard" theory). One Connecticut court at-
tempted to avoid this problem by deleting the names of the parties. Anonymous v. Hospital,
33 Conn. Supp. 126, 366 A.2d 204 (1976).
58. Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (Lycoming Cty. 1957); Terrell v. Garcia,
496 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974) (in which
the court used the reasoning that it is impossible to place a value on a "child's smile" or
other intangible benefits in order to determine an offset to the parent's recovery).
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS) § 920 (1979) PROVIDES:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or his prop-
erty and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff
that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of
damages, to the extent that this is equitable.
60. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); but see Cockrum v.
Baumgartner, 99 Ill. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981).
61. Compare supra notes 58 and 60.
62. 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982).
63. Id. at 240, 628 S.W.2d at 569.
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which both awarded and denied recovery, 64 with little discussion of
the actual reasoning used in those cases.
The court also briefly reviewed several public policy considera-
tions used in jurisdictions which have denied recovery. Among
these policy arguments were the "overriding benefits" theory, the
speculative nature of the damages, mitigation of damages through
abortion or adoption (recognizing that most courts have rejected
such mitigation as unreasonable), the application of Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 920 to reduce damages and the "emotional
bastard" theory.6 The court found these arguments persuasive and
held that Arkansas should also deny recovery for the expense of
raising the child based on public policy considerations. 66 The court
specifically reasoned that an award for the expense of raising the
child would undermine family stability and could be emotionally
damaging to the child in later years, and stated that not all problems
can be solved through litigation or in terms of dollars and cents.67
Justice Dudley wrote a strong dissent which was joined by
Chief Justice Adkisson. The dissent criticized the majority's appli-
cation of public policy in view of well-settled common-law prece-
dents68 and said that the majority had no basis on which to
determine or apply policy which has "erupted" rather than built
gradually like the common law.69 The dissent also argued that the
majority opinion subtly encouraged abortion or adoption which
conflicted with the majority's concern for family stability. 70 The dis-
senters favored an award of damages based on common-law negli-
gence but reduced by the value of the pleasure and joy the parents
receive from raising the child.7'
Wilbur v. Kerr is important because the court impliedly recog-
nized a new cause of action in Arkansas and discussed the possible
limitations on recovery for wrongful birth. It is also important be-
cause the court applied what it perceived to be public policy con-
cerning an award of damages for the cost of raising an unwanted
child. Not all writers agree that the courts should determine and
64. Id. at 240-41, 628 S.W.2d at 569-70.
65. Id. at 241-43, 628 S.W.2d at 569-71.
66. Id. at 244, 628 S.W.2d at 571.
67. Id. at 243-44, 628 S.W.2d at 571.
68. Id. at 244, 628 S.W.2d at 571-72 (Dudley and Adkisson, J. J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 244-45, 628 S.W.2d at 571-72.
70. Id. at 246, 628 S.W.2d at 572.
71. Id. at 246, 628 S.W.2d at 572-73.
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apply public policy, 72 and one writer maintains that when the court,
rather than the legislature, attempts to set public policy, it produces
public tensions because the court lacks the broad-based public input
enjoyed by the legislature.73
Other courts have maintained the viewpoint of the dissent in
Wilbur and have offered arguments for application of common law
precedent over public policy. A frequent contention is that the type
of reasoning used by the Arkansas Supreme Court creates an excep-
tion to the common-law rule which holds a tortfeasor liable for all
the foreseeable consequences of his negligence.74 This issue was ad-
dressed in Bowman v. Davis,75 in which the Ohio court explained,
"For this court to endorse policy that makes physicians liable for the
foreseeable consequences of all negligently performed operations
except those involving sterilization would constitute an impermissi-
ble infringement of a fundamental right. ' 7
6
The policy reasons relied on by the majority in Wilbur have
been rebutted by various courts in other jurisdictions. First, the
"emotional bastard" argument was avoided by the Connecticut
court by deleting the names of the parties from the case.77 Second,
the argument that not all problems can be solved in terms of dollars
and cents78 seems to imply that the damages are too speculative or
incapable of calculation. This argument has appeared in previous
cases involving new causes of action in tort such as wrongful death
or negligent infliction of emotional harm, and courts are now able to
assign a value to such injuries. 79 Another issue which should be
considered is the reduction of recovery based on the benefits rule of
72. See Aldisert, The Nature of the Judicial Process.- Revisited, 49 U. CIN. L. REv. 1
(1980); B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
73. Aldisert, supra note 72, at 5-7.
74. See Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 131 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 927 (1974) (held that public policy should not protect a negligent tortfeasor from the
consequences of his negligence).
75. 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976).
76. d. at 44, 356 N.E.2d at 499 (emphasis in original).
77. Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 126, 366 A.2d 204 (1976). It should be
noted that deleting the names of the parties may not have the effect of creating total ano-
nymity if the suit is brought in a small community.
78. Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 243-44, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (1982).
79. In Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971), the court compared
the difficulty of ascertaining damages in the instant case to earlier problems encountered by
courts in cases involving wrongful death. The court explained, "We do not, 'in the assess-
ment of damages, require a mathematical precision in situations of injury where, from the
very nature of the circumstances, precision is unattainable.' Particularly is this true where it
is the defendant's own act or neglect that has caused this imprecision." Id. at 248, 187
N.W.2d at 521 (quoting Purcell v. Keegan, 359 Mich. 571, 576, 103 N.W.2d 494, 496 (1960).
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the Restatement (Second) of Torts. One Pennsylvania court re-
jected such a reduction, and summarized, "The question is not the
worth and sanctity of life, but whether the doctors were negligent in
their surgical attempts at vasectomy and abortion .... "80
The debate over the propriety of judicial making of public pol-
icy centers on the issue of what the Wilbur dissent terms "no logical
sense of conscience""1 or the lack of proper guidelines in deciding
what public policy should be and how it should be applied. On the
other hand, those who support judicial use of public policy 82 point
out that it is a valuable tool for the courts in determining how the
law should be applied in a given situation. The law must evolve to
be compatible with the times for two reasons. First, public policy
considerations enable the court to apply old rules to new situations,
such as actions for wrongful birth. Second, it allows the courts to
mold legal principles to conform to changing public attitudes, a
good example being the Supreme Court's reflection of a change in
public attitude toward birth control as expressed in the Griswold83
and Wade84 decisions.
In Wilbur, the Arkansas Supreme Court determined that Ar-
kansas public opinion favors a limitation of common-law recovery
against a negligent defendant for the expense of raising a normal,
but unwanted child. However, in the future the court might very
well determine that public policy has shifted on this issue. By using
public policy reasons to support its present holding on this issue, the
Arkansas Supreme Court has left the door open for future revision
and may, on determination of a shift in public attitudes, award
damages for the expense of raising the child.85
Joel Taylor
80. Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496, 503 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (case involving a defec-
tive child); see also Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 m. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981)
(case involving a normal child).
81. 275 Ark. at 246, 628 S.W.2d at 572 (Dudley and Adkisson, J. J., dissenting).
82. B. CARDOZO, supra note 72.
83. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
84. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
85. The Illinois court provides a good example in which a court has reversed its percep-
tion of public policy toward awarding damages for the expense of raising a normal, but
unwanted child. In Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1979), the
court held that public policy forbids an award of such damages, based on reasoning similar
to that in Wilbur. Two years later, in Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 Ill. App. 3d 271, 425
N.E.2d 969 (1981), the court stated that the parents have a legally protected right to limit the
size of their family and that interference with this right is actionable. Therefore, the use of
public policy to nullify the injury would be an infringement upon the parent's basic rights.
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